Пацаны за океаном уже давно за нас переживают и боятся чрезмерной собственной мощи:

Because the results of the stochastic analytical tech-
niques the authors employ are largely driven by the assumptions that guide their
analysis, the U.S. policymakers in their scenario need not fear Russian retaliation. The
assumptions that the United States is able to catch the Russians in a extremely weak
day-alert position—with their submarines in port, bombers concentrated on a few run-
ways, and their mobile missiles in garrison, while launching a fully generated nuclear
force undetected by either Russian early warning systems or overhead and human sur-
veillance of the United States—determine the outcome of the exchange. By assuming
that “Russia is unable to launch its missiles before the ªrst wave of U.S. warheads ar-
rives on target” (p. 19), or that “the Russian early warning system would probably not
give Russia’s leaders the time they need to retaliate” (p. 22), one grants the United
States a splendid ªrst-strike capability before even beginning the analysis. Given the as-
sumptions that drive Lieber and Press’s nuclear exchange, the outcome enjoyed by the
United States would be no different than if the Russians lacked a nuclear arsenal: in
both situations, the United States could destroy or threaten to destroy Russia with no
fear of retaliation.6 This result does not correspond to reality because so long as a state
possesses a nuclear arsenal, there is always a possibility—however remote—that nu-
clear retaliation might occur following a nearly splendid ªrst strike.7
Correspondence: The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy?

Jeffrey S. Lantis
Tom Sauer
The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy? James J. Wirtz
Keir A. Lieber and
Daryl G. Press

Correspondence

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И среди прочего:

The 1989 Handbook of Economic Statistics, published by the
CIA, shows East Germany’s per capita income as 87.5% of West
Germany’s in 1988. The estimate for 1985 in the 1990 Statistical
Abstract of the United States shows it as slightly more than that
of West Germany’s. One wonders why traffic between the two
Germany’s has moved West rather than East. As recently as 1988,
a Brookings study expressed the establishment view that “Soviet
leaders have good reason to be proud of Soviet economic growth”
and claimed that Soviet income distribution is “far more equal
than…in the U.S.” Why in the world do Soviet citizens or their
leaders want any sort of economic restructuring?
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB893.pdf