The New Year’s Offensive
The Chechen forces did not leave Grozny through the opening towards the south as foreseen in the Russian plan. On the contrary, they used the opening for bringing in reinforcements to the city.
On December 26th Yeltsin decided in a meeting of the Russian Security Council that Grozny should be stormed immediately even if the military leaders wanted another two weeks to prepare the attack. Since the invasion the Russian forces had been reinforced with units from the Leningrad, Volga and Ural Military Districts. The total strength had now reached 38,000 men, 230 battle tanks, 353 APCs and 388 artillery pieces. According to a hastily composed plan the attack should take place along four axis converging on the city centre while two Spetsnaz groups deployed by helicopters should disturb the Chechen rear south of the city.[xii]
The Chechen defence of Grozny was lead by the Chechen Chief of Staff, Aslan Maskhadov, from the basement of the so-called presidential palace. An important role was played by “field commander” Shamil Basaev and his Abkhas Battalion. They were joined by other units as well as a large number of smaller groups.
The defence was organised district by district and each district had a number of groups, which operated quite independently. A typical group could consist of 8 to 10 men armed with one or two anti-tank weapons, a light machinegun, one or two sniper rifles and the rest of the men equipped with Kalashnikovs. Some groups, however, were smaller. The Chechens knew the city and were very mobile – moving through passages, back alleys and even sewers. They communicated by cellular phones.[xiii]
The attack commenced on December 31, but again the Russian plans fell to pieces when confronted with reality. The advancing Russian troops met with unexpected opposition. The advancing tanks and APCs were not protected by dismounted infantry and thus became easy targets for the Chechens who were able to attack with their anti-tank weapons from prepared positions in the buildings and ruins of the city.
The Chechen leadership decided to let the Russian forces move into the build-up areas of the city and fight them there, where the individual units could be surrounded, isolated and were without effective artillery or air support. The isolated tanks and APCs would then be attacked with anti-tank weapons in quick hit-and-run actions. In several cases the Russian columns were lured into narrow streets where first the front and rear vehicles were destroyed and then the rest of the column thus caught in an ambush from which they could not escape.
Of the advancing Russian groups it was only the northern under the leadership of general Lev Rokhlin, which reached the centre a few hundred meters from the presidential palace, where the Chechens had their headquarters. The 131st Independent Motorised Infantry Brigade (the Maikop Brigade) took the railway station. The other groups from east and west newer reached the centre. In the following battle around the railway station almost the whole 131st Brigade was wiped out. It lost 20 of its 26 tanks and 102 of its 120 APCs. Its commander, Colonel Ivan Savin and almost 1000 officers and men died and 74 were taken prisoners. As for the two Spetsnaz groups south of the city, they surrendered to the Chechens after having tried to survive without food for several days.
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