Because the results of the stochastic analytical tech-
niques the authors employ are largely driven by the assumptions that guide their
analysis, the U.S. policymakers in their scenario need not fear Russian retaliation. The
assumptions that the United States is able to catch the Russians in a extremely weak
day-alert position—with their submarines in port, bombers concentrated on a few run-
ways, and their mobile missiles in garrison, while launching a fully generated nuclear
force undetected by either Russian early warning systems or overhead and human sur-
veillance of the United States—determine the outcome of the exchange. By assuming
that “Russia is unable to launch its missiles before the ªrst wave of U.S. warheads ar-
rives on target” (p. 19), or that “the Russian early warning system would probably not
give Russia’s leaders the time they need to retaliate” (p. 22), one grants the United
States a splendid ªrst-strike capability before even beginning the analysis. Given the as-
sumptions that drive Lieber and Press’s nuclear exchange, the outcome enjoyed by the
United States would be no different than if the Russians lacked a nuclear arsenal: in
both situations, the United States could destroy or threaten to destroy Russia with no
fear of retaliation.6 This result does not correspond to reality because so long as a state
possesses a nuclear arsenal, there is always a possibility—however remote—that nu-
clear retaliation might occur following a nearly splendid ªrst strike.7