Army Assessments
In its study of tactical air support, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College submitted the following summary of the air interdiction campaign in Korea:
Notwithstanding the heavy damage inflicted by UN airpower, the overall air interdiction campaign in Korea had only partial success. The destruction did not succeed in significantly restricting the flow of the enemy's supplies to the frontlines, or in achieving interdiction of the battlefield. The attrition caused by the enemy to triple and retriple his efforts to supply the frontlines; it laid a costly burden upon his supply organization; it caused him widespread damage and loss. Yet no vital or decisive effect could be observed at the fighting front. Throughout the campaign, the enemy seemed to have ample strength to launch an attack if he wished. His frequent and heavy artillery barrages were evidence that he did not suffer from a shortage of ammunition. Captured prisoners said they had plenty of food, clothing, medical supplies, and ammunition for their small arms.28
General Mark Clark, who was Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command during the final year of the Korean War, judged the air interdiction campaign as follows:
The Air Force and the Navy carriers may have kept us from losing the war, but they were denied the opportunity of influencing the outcome decisively in our favor. They gained complete mastery of the skies, gave magnificent support to the infantry, destroyed every worthwhile target in North Korea, and took a costly toll of enemy personnel and supplies. But as in Italy, where we learned the same bitter lesson in the same kind of rugged country, our airpower could not keep a steady stream of enemy suppliers and reinforcements from reaching the battleline. Air could not isolate the front.29
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